Even though management scholars have offered several views on the process of corporate sustainability, these efforts have focused mainly on the technical aspects of sustainability while omitting the fundamental role played by individual moral competences. Therefore, previous work offers an incomplete and somewhat reductionist view of corporate sustainability. In this article, we develop a holistic framework of corporate sustainability in which both the moral and technical aspects of sustainability are considered. We do so by integrating the ethical, normative perspective of (...) the Catholic social teaching with the competitive view of the natural resource-based view. This framework highlights the importance of CST principles and ideas in developing executive moral competences such as moral sensitivity and awareness, and moral cognition and motivation. Moral competences, in turn, influence the organizational selection of environmental strategies, giving leaders the intrinsic motivation to promote both a longer-term stance on corporate sustainability efforts and a relentless search for greener business models. Such strategies move the firm closer towards achieving environmental sustainability. Hence, by bridging the individual, normative-ethical with the organizational, implementational levels of corporate sustainability, our framework provides a more realistic, coherent, and complete perspective on the complex process of achieving corporate sustainability. (shrink)

Even though management scholars have offered several views on the process of corporate sustainability, these efforts have focused mainly on the technical aspects of sustainability while omitting the fundamental role played by individual moral competences. Therefore, previous work offers an incomplete and somewhat reductionist view of corporate sustainability. In this article, we develop a holistic framework of corporate sustainability in which both the moral and technical aspects of sustainability are considered. We do so by integrating the ethical, normative perspective of (...) the Catholic social teaching with the competitive view of the natural resource-based view. This framework highlights the importance of CST principles and ideas in developing executive moral competences such as moral sensitivity and awareness, and moral cognition and motivation. Moral competences, in turn, influence the organizational selection of environmental strategies, giving leaders the intrinsic motivation to promote both a longer-term stance on corporate sustainability efforts and a relentless search for greener business models. Such strategies move the firm closer towards achieving environmental sustainability. Hence, by bridging the individual, normative-ethical with the organizational, implementational levels of corporate sustainability, our framework provides a more realistic, coherent, and complete perspective on the complex process of achieving corporate sustainability. (shrink)

La intensión del presente trabajo es la de explorar la relación medios-fines exponiendo que la misma se presenta en la obra de John Dewey como camino y horizonte coherente y consistente de su propuesta filosófica y educativa. La relación medios-fines dirige la investigación llevándonos a una comprensión del conocimiento como practica evaluativa y transformadora. Esta concepción epistemológica sienta las bases para repensar la educación y la democracia y brinda elementos suficientes para superar las dicotomías pensamiento - emoción, hechos - valores (...) y sociedad-individuo. El método utilizado es la investigación. La educación y la democracia son los espacios en los cuales la relación medios-fines, ya sea en su fase natural o adaptativa, ya sea en su fase moral o critica, ya sea en su fase social o publica, encuentra unidad y continuidad. En la educación de, por y para la democracia la inteligencia y la actividad se interrelacionan mutuamente. (shrink)

O objetivo desta reflexão é estabelecer um diálogo entre os espaços da educação, filosofia e política, buscando construir pontes entre eles. Seu embasamento teórico se refere à crítica ao capitalismo e ao conceito de reificação, a partir de autores da Escola de Frankfurt, de Foucault e de Benjamin. Um episódio ocorrido em 29 de abril de 2015 foi escolhido para análise por representar um evento paradoxal nos campos e conceitos apontados. Concluímos que é necessário se repensar novas ações entre as (...) práticas educativas, as ações políticas e os saberes filosóficos, nos quais seus sujeitos sociais tenham disponibilidade ao diálogo, ao respeito e à democracia. (shrink)

La filosofa de la liberacin latinoamericana es expresin de la realidad social e histrica de Latinoamrica. Los contrastes y la desigualdad se expresan en su discurso, tanto como en el historicismo, la sociologa y la teologa latinoamericanas.

This article presents arguments that seek to facilitate the understanding that the concept of Political Religion - as well as the authoritarian political experiences represented by it, such as Nazism and Stalinism - can be thought of in conjunction with the concept of fundamentalism. Furthermore, this article also presents possibilities for the concept of Civil Religion - which can also be classified as a Public Religion - even though it is often associated with political experiences considered democratic - such as (...) those of the United States and France - can also be considered in conjunction with that of fundamentalism. Therefore, this paper, carrying out an activity of delimitation and conceptual problematization, will define the concept of Political Religion, differentiating it from the concept of Civil Religion, and in a certain way from that of Public Religion, in an attempt to demarcate a concept of Public Religion, which has been mobilized, sometimes with a certain imprecision, by researchers from different areas. Although the objective of this article is not to empirically test the aforementioned concepts, by delimiting them, enhancing them, we seek to contribute to better yields in future analytical experiments. (shrink)

El presente artículo presenta los nuevos e importantes descubrimientos en la terraza litoral al pie del oasis de niebla, a partir de Noviembre de 2003, que junto a estudios anteriores conforman un cuadro general bastante completo de los patrones de asentamiento, modus vivendi, costumbres y actividades económicas de los antiguos pobladores costeros del norte de Chile, que reafirman la enorme importancia que adquirió el ecosistema de oasis de niebla costero en el género de vida, tipos de asentamiento y desplazamientos de (...) los cazadores-recolectores marinos del litoral norte. (shrink)

El estudio propuesto intenta ofrecer una entrada parcial pero ilustrativa del fenómeno de canonización de la figura autorial de Roberto Bolaño y su obra, desde una perspectiva sistémica, valorativa y diacrónica. El supuesto básico de este trabajo es que la lengua es un sistema social y una red de recursos de construcción de significado que se instancia a través de múltiples textos, surgidos según condiciones contextuales determinadas, orientados a la consecución de metas específicas y constreñidos por valores y reglas institucionales (...) que determinan su funcionamiento, orientación, circulación y predominancia. Se utiliza el enfoque lingüístico sistémico-funcional como marco teórico y se recurre a algunas de sus herramientas analíticas para explicar los significados interpersonales cristalizados en un texto crítico literario que sirve de ejemplo del tipo de discursos integrantes del proceso dinámico y conflictivo de formación de cánones literarios. El análisis demuestra que el texto presenta un compromiso mayoritariamente heteroglósico, pero realizado a través de uno de sus mecanismos menos explícitos y democráticos: la legislación. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é rever criticamente algumas interpretações contemporâneas da noção kantiana de intuição sensível. Defendo uma interpretação alternativa segundo a qual a intuição sensível em Kant deva ser entendida nos termos do que McDowell denomina sentido de re cuja principal característica é a dependênciado objeto. Nesse sentido, a função da intuição sensível é introduzir entidades no discurso para que essas possam ser conceituadas em juízos. Por essa razão,as intuições sensíveis devem ser vistas como o modo de se dar (...) dos objetos e seus atributos e relações que a eles se refere apenas na medida em que eles nos aparecem de forma dependente e relativa. (shrink)

No caminho dos trabalhos que versam sobre as questões envolvendo a autonomia da arte, categoria da Estética desde a modernidade, este artigo visa desenvolver explanações sobre dois autores, Arthur Schopenhauer e Herbert Marcuse que, devedores da estética kantiana, possuem perspectivas que permitem reflexões sobre a autonomia da arte, ainda que Marcuse se posicione como um crítico da perspectiva representada por Schopenhauer. Designadamente, este artigo apresentará a compreensão estética do filósofo Arthur Schopenhauer - na obra principal deste autor, O Mundo Como (...) Vontade e Representação – sobretudo o lugar do gênio artístico na obra do filósofo alemão, bem como apresentará os apontamentos do filósofo Herbert Marcuse na obra Dimensão Estética, de 1977, que sintetiza as principais questões da estética do autor. Palavras-chave: Schopenhauer, Marcuse, autonomia da arte, estética. (shrink)

Alchourrón y Bulygin sostienen que el derecho positivo, además de normas, contiene definiciones, que ponen de manifiesto un aparato conceptual a través del cual pensamos la realidad. A partir de esta afirmación argumentaré que hay un aspecto del derecho al que la teoría jurídica no ha prestado la atención que merece: la red de conceptos o categorías a través de la cual el derecho piensa, estructura, esquematiza o imagina la realidad. Sobre la base de una visión pluralista, sostengo que el (...) derecho moderno contiene una red conceptual singular, diferente a la construida por la ciencia y a la que está implícita en la vida cotidiana, aun cuando pueda receptar aspectos de una y otra. Dicho en el léxico de Quine, el derecho incluye criterios propios de objetivación e individuación, es decir, una ontología propia. En ese camino propongo algunas distinciones generales que pueden ser útiles para la descripción del derecho: definiciones expresas e implícitas por un lado; aparatos conceptuales derivados y aparatos conceptuales singulares del derecho, por el otro. La argumentación revela asimismo la relevancia y singularidad de categorías jurídicas muy básicas, como las de persona y cosa. (shrink)

Pain is a biological and subjective phenomenon. Clear understanding of its features is essential. Wierzbicka’s analysis accomplishes this. This comment discusses the relevance of her approach for the study of early evolution of medicine. The comment has six parts: (a) Wierzbicka’s theory and method; (b) its application to pain; (c) relevance of pain for the study of ethnomedicine, the cultural understanding of sickness and healing; (d) significance of natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) for understanding the evolution of human thought and behavior; (...) (e) relevance of NSM for studying biological and cultural evolution of early medicine; and (f) summary and conclusion. (shrink)

An important trend in contemporary epistemology centers on elaborating an old idea of pragmatist pedigree: theory selection (and in general the process of changing view and fixing beliefs) presupposes epistemic values. This article focuses on analyzing the case where epistemic values are indeterminate or when the sources of valuation are multiple (epistemic values like coherence and simplicity need not order options in compatible ways). According to the theory that thus arises epistemic alternatives need not be fully ordered by an underlying (...) notion of information-value and therefore the usual economic techniques of optimization cannot be applied in order to compute optimal contractions. But in cases of this sort it is still rational to maximize, i.e. to deem an option as choosable when it is not known to be worse that any other. We present here basic results about a notion of liberal contraction based on maximizing quasi-orderings. This requires the previous solution of some open problems in the theory of rational choice functions, namely a full characterization of choice functions rationalizable in terms of maximization of quasi-transitive relations. We conclude by discussing the problem of what is the adequate feasible set for calculating maximizing solutions for contraction problems and by considering the epistemological roots of some counterexamples against the most fundamental axioms on choice functions (like α). While the first part of the paper shows how economic insights can be used to improve our understanding of the principles of belief formation and change, this final section reverses this strategy by showing the utility of epistemological insights and techniques for providing invariance conditions capable of regulating the applicability of the pure principles of choice. (shrink)

A indiscutível riqueza da obra de Clarice Lispector já deu lugar a inúmeras interpretações.Neste ensaio, pretendemos acompanhar a leitura que Benedito Nunes realiza, pensando a literatura da escritora brasileira atravessada por um “centro mimético”. O conceito de mimese, distinguindo-se das concepções clássicas pensadas por Platão e Aristóteles, apontará, na leitura de Nunes, para a dramaticidade vivenciada por meio da linguagem na sua tentativa de falar sobre o mundo e o “eu” que o descreve. Para fins de clareza, analisaremos, com essa (...) categoria de “centro mimético”, três obras da autora que consideramos paradigmáticas: A cidade sitiada, A paixão segundo G.H. e A hora da estrela. (shrink)

:A good deal of contemporary moral nonconsequentialism assumes that agents have perfect knowledge about the various features and consequences of their options. This assumption is unrealistic. More often than not, moral agents can only assess with a certain degree of probability the factual circumstances that are morally relevant for their decision making. My aim in this essay is to discuss the problem of moral decisions under risk from the point of view of nonconsequentialism. Basically, I analyze how objective moral principles (...) can be transformed into subjective, decisional prescriptions, and argue that the standard nonconsequentialist approach to moral decision making, which focuses on probability thresholds, is wrong. In accordance with the fundamental postulates of nonconsequentialism, I seek to solve the problem of risk in moral choice by proposing a theory about the marginal moral value of various options. Actions can vary along various dimensions, and each of these dimensions can offer a different moral value function. Nonconsequentialist marginalism can level the playing field with consequentialism. Whereas consequentialism can simply borrow the notion of expected utility from economics, nonconsequentialism must introduce the notion of expectational obligation to formulate a general principle of moral choice under risk. I finally suggest that further empirical work is needed to delineate the shape of various moral value functions that are critical for applying the general principle of moral decision making under risk to well-known cases. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.DECISIONAL NONCONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE RISK SENSITIVITY OF OBLIGATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Horacio Spector DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000121Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. DECISIONAL NONCONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE RISK SENSITIVITY OF OBLIGATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Horacio Spector DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000121Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. DECISIONAL NONCONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE RISK SENSITIVITY OF OBLIGATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Horacio Spector DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000121Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Resumen: En Le courage de la vérité, justo antes del análisis en torno de la filosofía cínica, se hace referencia a una serie de textos que han abordado en alguna medida la cuestión del influjo del cinismo helenístico más allá de los márgenes de la Antigüedad. El único de los textos mencionados que no es alemán y que tiene como autor a alguien que pertenece al escenario intelectual de Foucault es Cynisme et passion de André Glucksmann, trabajo que ha sido (...) obviado por las diferentes investigaciones en torno a la filosofía cínica y por los estudios sobre la “vuelta” foucaultiana a los griegos. En el presente ensayo no procuraremos apenas dejar en evidencia la originalidad y pertinencia de la concepción glucksmanniana del cinismo, sino, además, mostraremos los elementos en los que se descubre un paralelismo entre dicha concepción y lo sostenido por Foucault en el último de sus seminarios impartidos en el Collège.: In Le courage de la vérité, just prior to his analysis of Cynicism, Foucault refers to a series of texts that have addressed, to some extent, the influence of Ancient Cynicism beyond the margins of ancient times. Among the texts mentioned, there is only one that is not German, whose author belongs to Foucault’s intellectual environment: André Glucksmann’s Cynisme et passion. This work has been ignored by both different pieces of research on Cynicism, and the studies regarding Foucault’s “return” to the Greeks. The present article will not merely highlight the originality and relevance of Glucksmann’s conception of Cynicism, but it will also reveal the elements in which parallelisms can be found between such conception and what Foucault claims in his last course at the Collège de France. (shrink)

Nuestro artículo analiza el libro de Elizabeth Anscombe destacando su carácter político. Cuando decimos «político» nos referimos a que desde su publicación opera como un filtro de exclusión de otras lecturas del Tractatus. En especial entendemos este texto como una expulsión a priori de las lecturas que privilegian la influencia de Arthur Schopenhauer. Describiremos las estrategias implícitas y explícitas del texto para dificultar e imposibilitar la lectura del libro de Wittgenstein en clave ética, estética o mística. Señalaremos la distancia que, (...) de modo crítico, el libro de Anscombe construye a manera de canon de lectura. Consideraremos, también, hasta dónde llega la influencia del filósofo de Frankfurt sobre el joven Wittgenstein y la actualidad de una lectura schopenhauereana de la primera obra del pensador vienés. (shrink)

Functional diversity holds the promise of understanding ecosystems in ways unattainable by taxonomic diversity studies. Underlying this promise is the intuition that investigating the diversity of what organisms actually do—i.e. their functional traits—within ecosystems will generate more reliable insights into the ways these ecosystems behave, compared to considering only species diversity. But this promise also rests on several conceptual and methodological—i.e. epistemic—assumptions that cut across various theories and domains of ecology. These assumptions should be clearly addressed, notably for the sake (...) of an effective comparison and integration across domains, and for assessing whether or not to use functional diversity approaches for developing ecological management strategies. The objective of this contribution is to identify and critically analyze the most salient of these assumptions. To this aim, we provide an “epistemic roadmap” that pinpoints these assumptions along a set of historical, conceptual, empirical, theoretical, and normative dimensions. (shrink)

My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske’s celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30pm CST on November 23 in 1963 (...) in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of type-B materialism against Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982) inspired by the Kantian main opposition between concepts and sensible intuitions. Like all materialists of type B, I argue that on her release from her black-and-white room, Mary makes cognitive progress. However, contrary to the so-called phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS), I do not think that such progress can be accounted for in terms of the acquisition of new concepts. I also reject Tye’s recent account of (...) Mary’s cognitive progress as the acquisition of a “thing-knowledge.” What is crucial is not the Russellian opposition between knowing things and knowing truths but rather the Kantian opposition between conceptual and nonconceptual representations of the same thing (property). Mary’s phenomenal knowledge is here accounted for as the result of the cooperation of her newly acquired nonconceptual representation of the same phenomenal redness (the same thing) she had a conceptual representation before. As that new nonconceptual representation carries information about the same physical property she already represented but is now coded in analog rather than in digital form (Dretske, 1981), that nonconceptual representation can be accounted for in physical terms as Chalmers’s Master argument requires. Nevertheless, that representation can account for Mary’s cognitive progress since it carries information coded in analog form, something that the imprisoned she could never possess. (shrink)

The claim that ―concepts serve as rules for the synthesis of representations‖ is understood by the mainstream of Kant‘s scholarship as if categories and concepts, in general, are conditions for the constitution of objects out of the manifold of sensations devoid of reference. That is the claim that I wish to question here. The claim comes in different flavors and formulations. Still, none of them are relevant here. I aim to provide an alternative account for the claim that ―the representation (...) makes the object possible.‖ I argue that the traditional view represents a solution to what I call the pseudo-problem of intentionality, namely to account for how a representation of something emerges out of a manifold of sensations devoid of reference. Yet, the intentionality problem is a misunderstanding of what I call the recognition thesis: the role of concepts is to provide the rules for the (mind-dependent) recognition (Erkenntnis) of the mind-independent existence of transcendental objects (noumena). ―The representation makes the object possible in the relevant sense that only by means of concepts can we recognize that what is sense-dependently represented actually exists mind-independently as transcendental objects or noumena in the negative sense. My view is embedded in the framework of what today is called ―Kantian Nonceptualism‖. Still, my view is neither a simple re-statement of Kantian Nonconceptualism nor depends on it. It is independently grounded on what Kant calls ―Erkenntnis‖. (shrink)

From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is a connection (...) between TD and global skepticism, the intriguing question is: Who is this skeptic? According to Strawson, “the skeptic” is a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience. In contrast, the fact that TD turns on the key notion of self-consciousness has induced several other scholars to assume that the skeptic is no none but a Cartesian external-world skeptic. None of those readings find textual support or are compatible with the very structure of the first Critique. The question is: Does this mean that TD aims only to undermine empiricism, as Guyer suggests? I do not believe so. I am pretty convinced that TD addresses a peculiar form of global skepticism, namely “Hume’s challenge to reason.” Assuming that we cognize (erkennen) and experience (erfahren) appearances as objects as a requirement of Newtonian physics, TD aims to provide a justification of the principle that nature is uniform that is superior to Hume’s justification. (shrink)

This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...) relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations.” The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations.” In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

I aim to develop an alternative theoretical model for the direct cognition of the elementary states of others called the theory of interaction (henceforth TI), also known as the “second person” approach. The model I propose emerges from a critical reformulation of the displaced perception model proposed by FRED DRETSKE (1995) for the introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Moreover, against Dretske, I argue that no meta-representation (second-order representation of a first-order representation as a representation) is involved in the (...) process, but only concepts, rudimentary enough, of others’ emotions: contentment and discontentment. Strictly speaking, all the empirical data and findings in developmental psychology only support the hypothesis that children in the pre-linguistic phase understand perceptual facial expressions of contentment and discontentment. My proposal consists of the following thesis: The direct perception of others' elementary mental states is not a perception in the usual sense of the word according to which we just perceive things, but rather a “perception of facts.” But how to understand that? It is nothing more than an epistemological process that is automatic and reliable at the same time. It is reliable in the epistemological-externalist sense of not involving any inference, reflection, theorizing or epistemic justification: a baby’s perception of her mom’s facial expression of discontentment (in the usual sense of “per- ception”) does not constitute a reason supporting the belief that mommy is discontent. The very word “belief” should not be understood in the usual sense but rather in the sense of a natural inclination for truth. But at the same time, it is automatic because the belief is a result or output of a process entirely subliminal and computational in nature. Thus, for instance, a child perceives that her mom is discontent (fact-awareness) by perceiving consciously (“perception” in the usual sense) a facial expression of discontentment (sensorial input) but recognizes that her mother is discontent as a result (output) of an entirely subliminal process. (shrink)

In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna‟s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls “a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in (...) the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. (shrink)

Este ensayo -que plantea algunas sugerencias quizás fecundas para la discusión- constituye un examen crítico de algunos aspectos significativos de la tesis intercultural de la obra de Raúl Fornet Betancourt. En este sentido, se ha organizado la exposición en tres apartados de desigual extensión: trayectoria, autocritica y reparos. El análisis de la obra de este autor permite concluir, en primer lugar, que su propuesta intercultural ha sido planteada por otros autores, lo que le resta originalidad; en segundo lugar, a pesar (...) de ser un una propuesta metodológica para el estudio del pensamiento latinoamericano, su reflexión no logra rebasar los límites del pensamiento eurocéntrico; y, finalmente, reducir las críticas y los reparos a una interculturalidad lastrada por la inculturación, es sólo una salida fácil e insuficiente. (shrink)

Let L be a language containing the modal operator B - for full belief. An information model is a set E of stable L-theories. A sentence is valid if it is accepted in all theories of every model.

Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...) that every Popper function is representable in terms of the standard real values of some infinitesimal measure. Our main goal in this article is to study the constraints on (qualitative and probabilistic) change imposed by an extended version of McGee's result. We focus on an extension capable of allowing for iterated changes of view. Such extension, we argue, seems to be needed in almost all considered applications. Since most of the available axiomatizations stipulate (definitionally) important constraints on iterated change, we propose a non-questionbegging framework, Iterative Probability Systems (IPS) and we show that every Popper function can be regarded as a Bayesian IPS. A generalized version of McGee's result is then proved and several of its consequences considered. In particular we note that our proof requires the imposition of Cumulativity, i.e. the principle that a proposition that is accepted at any stage of an iterative process of acceptance will continue to be accepted at any later stage. The plausibility and range of applicability of Cumulativity is then studied. In particular we appeal to a method for defining belief from conditional probability (first proposed in [42] and then slightly modified in [6] and [3]) in order to characterize the notion of qualitative change induced by Cumulative models of probability kinematics. The resulting cumulative notion is then compared with existing axiomatizations of belief change and probabilistic supposition. We also consider applications in the probabilistic accounts of conditionals [1] and [30]. (shrink)